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Experience in the Thought of Louis Lavelle
Robert Lechner
Louis Lavelle might be considered a typical French philosopher, even to the
point of writing two of his major works in prison camp, the same place where
Dufrenne and Ricoeur carried on such intense philosophic activity. Perhaps it
might be better to say that Lavelle was typical with reference to successful French,
academic careers. After a varied academic career in philosophy, he ended up at
the Sorbonne and the College de France. He belongs to the classical, French spiritualist tradition in his thought. It hardly needs mentioning that this tradition is
Cartesian. More recently it has taken on the name of reflexive-philosophy or,
sometimes, philosophy of the spirit. It can also be spoken of as classical humanism
or anthropology with the focus on the inner-side of man.
Lavelle is in this tradition in the strong sense. However, he has his own modifications and reservations. He seeks a balance but would go on the idealistic side
of experience as Calvin Schrag makes the inventory in the introduction to his recent book, Experience and Being (p. 7). An overt activism. An interiorization of
experience. A neglect of the facti city of nature. The experienced phenomenal world
becomes an inner-world. The only access to experience is that of radical introspection or inward intellectual intuition. The facticity of man's natural environment is dissolved by an absolute freedom and the finitude of the concrete experience goes unacknowledged , for the most part. To all these, at least a half-hearted
"yes" from Lavelle. But still he has something to say to whomever wants a total
view of experience, within and without. He has a sufficiently large body of writings
to bring out into the open both the weaknesses and the strength of the tradition
he represents. Philosophizing in the grand style of those who think that the Absolute, in one way or another, is what philosophy is all about, he might keep our
final vision of experience from being too narrow.
Experience for Lavelle -is metaphysical experience. His whole philosophy can
be summed up as a methodology of metaphysical experience. However speculative
his thought, he is always telling us how we can inscribe ourselves in being and
become real. Metaphysical experience is going from the given to presence, going
from immediate experience to primitive experience, the experience of total
presense, the experience of the Absolute.
If you ask what counts as experience in seeking the Absolute , self or world,
Lavelle's reply is in the Augustinian tradition where self counts as primitive experience. He is in the tradition where the goal of philosophic activity is not speculative knowing or understanding but the recovery of the presence of the Absolute
as a creative source with the consequent integration of the self. However, Lavelle
does not end up in the world of the transcendentals-true, good or being-but the
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final word for Lavelle is the same as for that tradition for which the world counts
as experience, pure act. His philosophy is one of radical interiority. "Radical
interiority" falls upon our ears with a kind of anachronistic sound. If this approach
to philosophy has not been put to rest with the critique of Descartes over the
years, it surely has been done in by the contemporary phenomenological critique
of interiority, where exteriority is the very law of being. Lavelle is not intimidated
by all this. He still proposes the ontological experience as the experience of catching man in the very act of being himself. He has enough built-in ambiguity in his
thought to be called an "existential idealist."
This act does not reveal itself to us in the ordinary world. While ordinary experience is not presented as an obstacle to philosophic experience, as it might be
in a fully-blown idealistic tradition, nevertheless Lavelle stresses the negative
aspects of it in comparison to the tasks of philosophic thought and experience.
Like Heidegger, there is a world of everydayness we must leave behind. Something like Husser!, there is a natural standpoint we must turn our backs on. To
move on from this world of the ordinary and the everydayness demands certain
moral conditions: a certain innocence, a spirit free from self-interest and from
preoccupations with particulars and details. (Presence totale, p. 27). Lavelle simply repeats the demands for moral integrity demanded by all philosophers since
Plato who see philosophy as a way of life. Visible things, images and the objects
of our habitual interests and desires only appear to support us (L' Acte, p. 9). Our
real support is elsewhere. What we are really seeking is an interior source which
philosophers have always called "act."
Metaphysical experience for Lavelle is an inward journey. However, it is not
an isolated experience. The primitive experience is also the primitive fact that I
am unable to set up being independently of myself who takes hold of it or establish myself independently of being in which I inscribe myself. Lavelle insists on
this inescapable mutuality. The exact point where I find myself open to ontological
experience, Lavelle says, is not my solitary thought, with Descartes in mind, without a doubt. Nor is it in my encounter with obstacles (Rene LeSenne in mind here).
Nor is it in my experience of anxiety, with evident references to Heidegger and
Kierkegaard.
In the tradition of Maine de Biran, Lavelle finds the experience of initiative as
basic. This is the experience of the power that I have of introducing a change
into the world by my initiative alone. The example of the experience of initiating
the movement of my little finger is as pervasive in the writings of Lavelle as the
index cards that stood for people for Marcel in his work in the bureau of missing
people during World War I. This initiative is an act of the will. I do not know the
source from which it comes. This source is not available to me. A movement appears out of nothing it seems and disappears again into nothing, as soon as I cease
my initiative.
This is an experience different from the experience of any object. This is an
experience that has no place for anything that is other. It is an experience of total
identification. I experience myself as cause of myself and without this experience
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I could be the cause of nothing else. I experience self as the pure power of acting,
as an actual presence always there. If the word "mystery" has anything to say
here, it is not with reference to the effect in the visible world, but rather with
reference to my possibility of being a first beginning. The first beginning of an
event that will be, which makes me the first beginning of myself. Without this
dimension I would only be a thing among things . Without this experience, I would
never say "I." Consciousness is the result of this experience. Here I take hold of
being being born. I take hold of being in its pure interiority, this is my only experience of taking hold of reality from within.
Joined to this experience of initiative, of the power to say "I," is the experience
of being overwhelmed by a being which contains this power and exceeds it. The
whole of being as actual comes into my experience of saying " I." We take hold
of an act or join it. We join being, not as it is in itself, but being in us giving itself
being (L'intimite spirituelle, p. 213). Lavelle says that there is nothing else to call
this but a contact with the Absolute. There is no other way to characterize it. The
act which I touch is one with my self-presence. It is the very act by which we
exist. I take hold of my being at the interior of all being. As distinguished from
the artist, the philosopher does not live from the image which he makes of the
world but more exclusively from the awareness that he has of himself (L'Intimite
spirituelle, p. 212). We ask of the philosopher a revelation concerning the being
that we are .
Here we might look at one or two of Lavelle 's reflective justifications for positions that sound somewhat like philosophy by proclamation. In brief, the act I
experience surpasses myself. Concerning this, Lavelle remarks, "men have almost
always had the prejudice that the world which they call interior or subjective is
a world which does not go beyond the limits of their own indvidual self and that
only the world which they call exterior or obj ective is a world which surrounds
them, contains them, surpasses them (L'Intimite spiritu ell e, p. 218). But "subjective " does not necessarily say "individual" anymore than "objective" necessarily
says "universal." At some length Lavelle compares the interior world in which
the self is located to the larger world in which our body is located. Making allowances for differences and the use of metaphor, Lavelle insists that the general
comparison is valid enough. He says, "our spirit is inseparable from an infinite
spirit in which it never ceases to participate and from which it borrows all the
resources at its disposal." (L' intimite spiritu elle , p. 218) . The specific relation here
is not that of two things in the material world, it is not that of part and whole.
but the unique unity that is possible for two acts.
How do we know that all this is not just an hypothesis, that there is just nothing
beyond my self-experience. Lavelle simply appeals to ex peri ence here, says that
we do distinguish between what is self and not-self in the subjective world. He
says that this is the experience of an immediate presence, like the immediate
presence by which I distinguish my own body from all other bodies in the world
around me. The distinction in immediate presence between my body and the
world in the objective realm becomes, in the subjective world, this immediately

Published by eCommons, 1971

41 3

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 8 [1971], No. 1, Art. 6
felt distinction between the actual and the possible (L'Intimite spirituelle, p. 220).
Lavelle says that this is common experience (Ibid., pp. 220-1). Finally, he remarks
that it would be seriously wrong to think of this absolute in which we are rooted
as simply indetermined, infinite possibility which we actualize (Ibid, p. 222), as if
we could call it into being. We receive not only the possibility but also the power
to actualize this. It is in relation to us that the absolute is a totality of all possibilities (Ibid., p. 223). Here Lavelle is insisting that possibility is meaningful only in
relation to act and that the absolute is not the sum of all possibilities but is the
origin and source of them.
In one primitive experience I discover myself rooted in absolute act, discover
and establish myself. Here Lavelle does not speak of self-being but of the se1f-ofbeing. (L'Intimite spirituelle, p. 226). This experienced-act is never independent
or isolated. In one global experience I experience my own identity and initiative,
my self-presence, my participation in absolute act. To complete the picture, Lavelle
speaks of an "interval" between these two acts, an interval which is filled by the
world. All of one piece is the experience of self. participation in absolute act and
inscription of myself in the world. all of which can add up to " consent to being"
or "total presence."
It is quite evident that for Louis Lavelle metaphysical experience is not what
is ordinarily referred to as "the given" but it more like an achievement. It is the
goal of the whole philosophic enterprise. We might call this more naturally "ontological experience" for without a doubt Lavelle is concerned with the experiencing
of the origin, the source. the ground of our being. Lavelle seeks the place where
this experience is available to us. There should be nothing new in this for philosophers whose profession is based on the fact that however much reality seems all
laid out and available to us, we must somehow seek what is already there, persuade it to show itself to us, bring out into the open what is hidden, learn to experience what is right there before us.
The following remark is from a brief essay called "Temoignage." It is from an
essay Louis Lavelle was preparing for an issue of Les Etudes Philosophiques at
the time of his death in 1951. "The discovery of self is the discovery of a being
that participates in the being of the whole. And this participation is such that
self is this being in place of seeing it. And in speaking of this whole. of all being.
it says "I" or "me." And in place of being outside, all this is from within."
(L'Intimite spirituelle, p. 282).
DePaul University, Chicago
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